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THE NEXTSTEPS: RECOVERY’S FIFTH YEAR
Perhaps the most important single economic fact about Tanzania today is that 
1988 is the fifth year of recovery and that over 198-4—88 GDP will have grown 
almost a fifth from its 1983 trough and over a seventh from its pre-war and 
recession level of 1978. Per capita GDP is probably still about a seventh 
down on 1978 but has begun to recover - it was at least a sixth down in 1985.
Those data underline a second salient fact, recovery is a long, hard road and
while the first steps were taken over 1980-83 no positive effects - even in 
retrospect - were clear until 1984-85 while even today the pace is
unsatisfactory as is the human condition both of a near majority of urban
households (less so before 1978) and of perhaps a third of rural (much the 
same as a decade ago).
The threats to sustaining recovery are only too clear: war bills imposed by 
RSA, weather and terms of trade, external financial flows, export (earned 
import capacity growth), sustaining an articulated and not very dramatic nor 
individually high payoff set of efficiency improving measures, political 
tenacity in the face of slow gains. The most immediate has been the first - 
1 9 8 7 / 8 8 saw costs of the order of $125-150 million, two-thirds direct or 
indirect imports, to provide military solidarity with Mozambique (and to 
thwart RSA’s intention to push its armed bandits across the Tanzanian border 
in force.) The second remains an ever present threat. 1988 is the fourth 
above average to good harvest year in a row; a lean year (or years) will come 
sooner or later; 80,000 planned and perhaps 100,000 more unplanned reserve 
stocks of maize can see off one bad year but not two. Since their sharp falls 
in 1986 and 1987, the prices of Tanzania’s commodity exports have on average 
firmed a little but some downside risk remains and there are no realistic 
prospects for sharp trend rises let alone even a two to three year boom.
External financial gross inflows are probably now again in excess of $500 
million - the $900 (or $650 to $800 excluding technical assistance) million 
annual pledges of 1986-1987-1988 are misleading because of technical 
assistance and other 'intra-donor’ items and because of lags. That is, to be 
realistic, not quite enough; any serious downturn could halt recovery, 
especially until a multi year resolution of the unmanageable external debt 
service burden is achieved (as it was not in 1987 contrary to anticipations). 
Export increases have been slow with disease (cashew), price falls (coffee),
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slow turnaround of rundown production units (sisal) and processing/transport 
bottlenecks (cotton) all contributing (or, more accurately, subtracting). In 
any event new exports, e.g. manufacturing, gold, natural gas products are 
needed - the 1977/87 terms of trade debacle plus the cashew diseases have made 
the old base permanently inadequate - and here (except for limited recovery on 
the manufactured side) progress has been even slower.
Efficiency increases have been achieved - from grain marketing through harbour 
operation to electricity. But the gaps are only too clear, e.g. water, 
non-SADCC sector transport, agricultural processing, much of industry. 
Because the specific problems vary, so must actions (e.g. Dar Water has rates 
about 10Í of breakeven level and as a result such wretched service provision 
and billing system it cannot proceed by marginal to moderately radical 
improvements from a sound base as could TANESCO in electricity). Further the 
lead time for results can be long, e.g. for the badly deteriorated non-TAZARA 
rail lines and the cotton ginneries which have been the object of evidently 
inadequate rehabilitation efforts for over five years. Thus ingenuity, 
initial funding injections and tenacity are needed if the gaps - especially in 
transport and manufacturing - limiting the pace and threatening to block 
continuation of recovery are to be filled.
The political will problem has probably been overplayed. Certainly 1984—88 
policy and performance has critics - but it has demonstrable results and 
therefore supporters as well. Most peasants are better off; over 1986—1988 
the minimum wage's purchasing power fall has been arrested; basic health, 
education and rural water services have begun to be improved again; more goods 
manifestly are available (and not always at higher prices); inflation has not 
risen (indeed it has fallen from the 1984/85 peak). The President, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Finance have concrete and convincing answers for 
their critics and no hesitation in making them.
The Party did vote the Minister for Finance off the National Executive (which 
incidentally has had the MF as a member for a minority of the whole 1961-1988 
period) but it also endorsed the 1984-1987 economic strategy and its 1988-1992 
projection. The anger of the quasi and extra Party left with Chairman 
Nyerere's position on economic strategy (indeed with his re-election) suggests 
that the right view that he has opposed 1984 and 1986 economic strategy 
initiatives and their continuation is crudely reductionist.
Ironically the greatest political argument once again surrounds the exchange 
rate. From July 1 9 8 7 to January 1988 it was floated down nearly 6$ a month, 
even measured against a sinking dollar, from Sh 6*1 to Sh 94 to the dollar. 
This was clearly under IMF pressure despite the fact that on the IMF's real 
value against a weighted basket of trade partner currencies Sh 80-85 to the 
dollar in January 19 88 would have marked a return to 1979-80 when it did not 
see the shilling as overvalued.
Domestic criticism - and fear of blocking managing the domestic inflation rate 
down - led to rather erratic 1988 management of the rate but by September it 
had moved to Sh 104 to the dollar suggesting a return to 20 to 25$ a year 
nominal devaluation to offset Tanzania inflation of 25$ to 30$ a year, 20 to 
25$ in excess of a trading partner average of say 5$. The speedup, halt, stop 
and go pattern with clearly negative impact on political support and infla, on 
control again underlines how counter-productive one instrument focussed policy 
pressure on Tanzania in respect to exchange rates has been and remains.
Macroeconomic Aggregates: On The Up and Up?
In 1987 constant price Gross Domestic Product rose 3*9$ about the same as 
1986's 3*8$ but both above the (probably overestimated) assumed population 
growth trend of 3*3$ and the 1984-1985 average of somewhat over 2$. If - as 
seems likely - growth rises to 5$ odd in 1988 and - as is less certain - 
remains there in 1989-1991 then the targetted Economic Recovery Programme
1986-1991 rate of 4.5$ will be attained.
The sectoral makeup of growth also improved in 1987 with agriculture at 4.4$, 
manufacturing at 4.2$, transport at 4.5$, commerce at 4.8$ and energy and 
water at 7.5$ - rates which suggest that the 3*9$ is an underestimate as real 
levels of most government services (largely estimated on employees not output 
in GDP accounts) rose and the use of crop purchasing year data pushed low 1986 
purchases of several export crops into 1987 and the higher 1987 figure into
_ n _
Current price Gross Domestic Product in 1987 was in the vicinity of Sh T
230,000 million. If one uses an average exchange rate of T Sh 64 = $USA 1, 
that gives $140 per capita - a sharp fall. However, this is the result of 
dramatic exchange rate changes over 1 9 8 6- 1987 and the moving average estimates 
of the World Bank putting the figures in the low $200's is more realistic as 
an order of magnitude and the constant domestic price figures are better as 
orders of change, especially as current price GDP at least through 1985 and to 
a lesser extent since was seriously underestimated especially in respect of 
food crops for which official prices were used even though higher market ones 
were collected and used in Cost of Living estimates and as inputs into policy 
formulation. 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 saw some improvement in the statistical process of GDP
estimation but substantial question marks remain.
In 1987 Fixed Capital formation fell 5.5Í in constant price terms to slightly 
over 2 7% of GDP. However, that follows a 1986 rise, is quite high by 
Sub-Saharan African standards and is well above a plausible capital stock 
wear, tear and termination estimate of 10—12% of GDP.
The decline was complex in makeup. Civil engineering fell sharply because 
several large infrastructural projects were completed in 1986 or early 1987. 
Machinery and transport equipment appear to have stagnated or fallen which 
contrasts oddly with import statistics unless import prices (in foreign 
currency terms) for the former rose by 20Í or more. Building material imports 
fell in real and stagnated in nominal terms but increased domestic production 
allowed a 27% growth in building construction concentrated in private sector
housing and small to medium scale commercial structures.
The macro record justifies Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning 
C. D. Msuya’s June 1988 Budget Speech assertion:
the implementation of the ERP has in general been on track.
Although it will take time for actions taken to bear 
substantial visible results there are indications that steps 
taken have contributed to the initial successes observed...
and his warning:
the implementation of the ERP has also faced problems. It is 
important to examine them seriously and carefully with 
[special attention to] foreign exchange availability, 
Government Budget, Credit creation and Pricing.
Budget Balances And Balancing; Plan Perspectives
In 1987 the CCM Congress adopted a 1987-2002 Party Programme restating the
goals of self-reliance and transition to socialism with 1987-1992 Party 
Guidelines for the first of four development plans within the Programme period 
concentrating on reconstruction and encompassing/extending the 1986-1989 
Economic Recovery Programme. In practice the 19 8 8 -8 9 Annual Plan and 
Development Budget are the first to take full account of the Guidelines which 
were adopted after the 19 8 7 - 8 8 Budget albeit their preliminary formulations 
informed it to some extent.
In 1987-88 Recurrent Expenditure was budgeted at Sh T 60,100 million and
Development at Sh T 17,300 million for a total of Sh T 77>400 million. 
Estimated actual outturn just before the close of the financial year was Sh T 
61,800 million recurrent and Sh T 15,100 million Development for a total of Sh 
T 76,900 - just under 100Í in current price and probably 95i in real terms (as 
the Budget assumed 25Í inflation as opposed to 30/6 odd actual).
The net overrun on Recurrent spending was dominated by about Sh 1,250 million 
Supplementary Estimates for military solidarity with Mozambique and driving 
back South Africa's armed bandits (the so-called Renamo) from the Tanzania 
border. Apart from that the use of contingency votes did cover virtually all 
unprojectable cost overruns including those from higher domestic inflation 
(30% vs 25Í) and foreign goods inflation (13-5% in foreign currency terms vs 
5Í and about 60Í from devaluation versus 40-45Í) than were expected at the 
time of the 1987-88 Budget Speech.
Recurrent Revenue rose to Sh 46,800 million about 2% above estimates but the 
recurrent gap to be filled from foreign loans and grants plus bank borrowing 
rose from Sh 13,500 to Sh 15,000. Higher than expected devaluation may have 
offset lags in foreign fund disbursement but it seems likely that final 
domestic bank borrowing will have been Sh 1 ,000 to 1 ,500 million instead of 
the nominal 263 million budgeted. However even the higher end of that range 
is down from Sh 1 ,700 million in 19 8 6 - 8 7 and Sh 5>600 million in 1985-86 - in
constant price terms over 80Í down on the 1985-86 figure. The snag in this
quite real record of sustained progress toward fiscal rebalancing is that 
foreign funds account for about 2 0% of the Recurrent and - less seriously - 
over 7 0% of the Development (Fixed Capital) Budget or 30Í overall.
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1988/89 Recurrent Expenditure is estimated at Sh T 90,272 million - about ^7$ 
above 1987-88 estimates in nominal terms and - allowing for 25$ domestic 
inflation, wage increases and foreign exchange price rises about 17.5$ up in 
real terms. There is a clear effort to begin to break the underfunding 
bottleneck holding back services - and especially infrastructure maintenance 
and repair - to estimate regional and local government as well as defence 
costs adequately and to provide finance for a national grain reserve and to 
provide a substantial contingency fund (Sh T 9,736 million or nearly 11$ of 
the total) to meet unprojectable or unexpected cost rises.
Domestic Recurrent Revenue - after Income Tax reductions and Tariff 
restructuring but before new revenue measures - was estimated at Sh 62,670 
million up by about 22$ nominally and down perhaps 2 to 5$ in constant price 
terms which may suggest cautious estimation or inadequate attention to price 
rise impact on indirect taxes. After Sh T 1,800 million new and raised taxes 
and charges and Sh 5,750 million from enhanced collection (largely of income 
tax) the recurrent revenue estimate stood at Sh 70,212 million or 50$ nominal 
and 20$ odd constant price above 1987-88. This suggests that the Minister’s 
stated intent of reducing tax, charge and fees relative to GDP from their 
1987-88 ratio of 23$ (normal by industrial economy standards but high by SSA 
and almost twice that of some least developed economies) applies only to those 
who paid their 1987-88 taxes without evasion and intended to be is more than 
cross-cancelled nationally by tighter collection.
The continued emphasis on the latter is interesting because since the 
beginning of GDP recovery Tanzania has raised real domestic revenue 
significantly each year and contrasted to many other SSA systems has 
relatively efficient collection. Simplification of customs rates from 20 to 7 
(over a 0$ to 100$ range for basic items through luxury consumer goods with 
production inputs plus medical and educational materials in the 0$ to 25$ 
range) is primarily a tidying up back to the limited category (5 basic ones) 
of 1980 from the miscellaneous special case accretions which were tacked on 
over the intervening 7 years, as will be the parallel exercise in respect to 
Sales Tax slated for 1989 implementation.
The new/enhanced charges and rates for 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 (apart from the old standbys of 
beer and soft drinks) are partial inflation catch ups on fees set in nominal
terms. (Unfortunately water charges do not appear because Dar es Salaam Water 
is now a corporation and despite electricity and chemical bills each wildly in 
excess of total revenue appears to lack the Treasury's ability to ram through 
revenue increasing measures!) In respect to road tolls a pattern of tying new 
posts to major rehabilitation work - on stretches of the Great North Road from 
Zambia and the Dar-Arusha trunk route - is evident. On secondary school fees 
the increase is coupled to a firm statement that remission will be available 
to any child whose parents cannot pay - a promise which in the past has been 
relatively effectively honoured.
After use Sh 19,500 million of external funding (21 % of Recurrent Estimates) 
the domestic bank borrowing estimate stands at Sh 600 million or well under 1$ 
of the Recurrent Estimates. The Development Estimates of Sh 28,400 million 
are up by 39$ nominally and somewhat over 10% in constant price terms on the
1987-88 probable outturn. Finance is apparently envisaged to be Sh 2,500 
million non bank domestic borrowing (9$) and Sh 25,900 million external (91%)-
The 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 Plan provides - at financial projection level - for investment of 
Sh 48,115 million of which 59$ is in the Development (Capital) Budget 
including regional and council investment and loans/equity injections into 
parastatals. Sh 19,715 million is estimated to come from enterprise and 
household own resources and banking system loans. This implies about 25$ 
private investment dominated by housing and commercial premises with smaller 
transport, construction industry and other directly productive investments.
Sectorally the Plan (and Capital Budget) allocate 41$ (42$) to directly
productive, 30$ (34$) to infrastructural, 10$ (19$) to social service -
primarily health and education) and 19$ (5$) to other services dominated by 
housing (public administration). Assuming a 5$ growth in real GDP this would 
seem likely to raise the Gross Fixed Capital Formation to Output ratio to 
about 30$ of GDP (at least in constant price terms). With foreign net 
resource transfers at perhaps $500 million (Sh T 55,000 - 60,000 million) that 
implies domestic saving of the order of 10 to 12.5$ of GDP, unsatisfactory but 
well up on its mid-1980s low of around 5 to 6$.
External Imbalances And Gapmanship
Tanzania's external balance is fragile for three reasons. First, with 1987 
imports of goods $1,092 million and exports $347 million only net transfer 
receipts in excess of exports are able to keep the gap plugged. Second, 
exports are not rising rapidly remaining static over 1986-87 with main 
commodity proceeds falling over 20% for price and volume reasons balanced by 
rises in manufactures, secondary commodities and minerals. Third, the 1987 
import level of $1,092 million (only 4? up nominally and down perhaps 6 - 8% 
in volume terms on 1986) includes $125 - 150 million of consumer goods and 
perhaps $50 - 75 million defence related elements not included in the $1,200 
million minimum imports for efficient rehabilitation and operation of the 
economy so that the shortfall is of the order of 20%. Compared to the 1983 
situation, however, imports are up over 35% in nominal terms (and perhaps 15? 
in real) and external transfers are up markedly albeit exports have (largely 
for price reasons) actually declined falling over $90 million to 1985 before 
rising over $60 million thereafter.
On a fiscal year basis the trends are slightly more encouraging. The 1986/87 
level was $355 million and 1987/88 is estimated at $388 but even here main 
commodity exports showed a fall of $44 million whereas exports of manufactures 
rose $32 million (the whole net gain) and of minerals and secondary 
commodities by $44 million.
The basic 1987/88 arithmetic was exports of goods $388 million, $600 million 
external resource transfers, $250 million ''own forex” and supplier credit 
imports, debt service $150 million, imports $1,185 million and other net 
services and transfers inflows plus errors and omissions of the order of $125 
million. Assuming - as estimated - that half the $250 million represent key 
imports in the target of $1,200 million and that defence imports not 
implicitly included are $50 million then there is a shortfall of about 16? 
with $1,010 of $1,200 million key rehabilitation, operation and capital goods 
imports actually achieved.
1987 terms of trade outturn was poor. In exporter currency terms industrial 
economy prices for exports to Tanzania rose 13*4? over 19 86 and oil by almost 
20? (albeit after an over 40? decline in 19 8 6). Main commodity export prices 
- dominated by coffee - fell on the order of 25?. In 1988 the likely result
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is one of slightly moderately import price rises and lower export price falls 
but still deterioration.
With external debt - including visible and invisible trade arrears of perhaps 
$700 million - of the order of $5,000 million Tanzania is clearly a "debt 
distressed low income economy". Before rescheduling, the total interest and 
principal payable plus a 20$ rundown on commercial arrears would come to the 
order of $550 million or 150$ of exports.
The 1986 Paris Club rescheduling (arrears plus 1986/87 instalments of 
bilateral loans and guaranteed credits from Western states) with five year’s 
deferral of 97.5$ and payment of those sums over five years from 19 91 gave 
limited breathing space and no more. The sought 1987 agreement to 1 oil 
forward 1987/92 payments for a longer period (say to 1997/02) and to stre ch 
out repayments as well as reducing interest rates proved non-negoti^ble 
despite a Mozambican precedent. As a result more or less 'condoned' arrears 
on bilateral debt built up in 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 with renewed negotiations on a more 
permanent solution anticipated about the end of 19 8 8.
Tanzania has been among the more outspoken and clearly articulated African 
countries in seeking a general solution - including a guideline setting 
African/Creditor conference - to African external debt crises. It has 
endorsed the initiatives - e.g. by the UK Chancellor - leading to the Venice 
Summit proposals for longer rescheduling, lower interest and/or partial 
writeoff. The South Commission - led by CCM Chairman and past President 
Julius Nyerere - has made this issue one of its priority areas for study.
1986/87 Consultative Group pledges (almost all grants and very soft loans) 
excluding technical assistance totalled $660 million and 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 $740 million 
(with semi-pledges of a slightly higher magnitude for 198 8/8 9 ). In 1 9 8 6 / 8 7  
$450 million was utilised (64$) an in 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 $490 million (66$). While a 
smaller lag/leakage than most, that use ratio is unsatisfactory and Tanzania 
is holding discussions to identify procedural ways and means of raising it to 
80 -85$ (especially as some of the worst lags have been on import support 
loans).
The significant sources of external support for Tanzania remain highly 
diversified including all major OECD Members, the World and African
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Development Banks, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Iran and several socialist 
states plus major UN agencies including ILO, IFAD and UNICEF. This in part 
offsets very limited access to commercial credit (inevitable given payment 
record and arrears levels). On that front a revolving credit for petroleum 
was negotiated with commercial banks but only via an escrow agreement securing 
it on coffee export proceeds.
Export promotion - from devaluation and foreign currency retention and other 
"Export to Import" schemes - has appeared to begin to yield results outside 
the main commodity exports. It is to be bolstered in 1988/89 by 
re-instituting a more workable duty drawback on goods used in exports and by 
ending the "own forex" import licence scheme which clearly operated primarily 
as an incentive to smuggled exports and related exchange control dodges and on 
the import side had a bias (even after tighter regulation) to amenity consumer 
goods including de facto saloon cars disguised under the rubric "extended cab 
pickups".
Tanzania continued to be active in SADCC albeit its technical unit and 
articulated leadership in the Industrial and Trade sectors allocated to it was 
criticised for showing erratic zeal with limited professional backup. The 
proposed SADCC raised resources for national import to export revolving funds 
should, when achieved, substantially help Tanzanian export capacity especially 
in manufacturing and secondary commodities.
In the transport area SADCC has clearly helped sharpen Tanzania's planning, 
fundraising and implementation for those links falling in the SADCC Programme 
of Action. TAZARA (with an over $60 million USAID grant), Dar Harbour and 
TAZAMA Pipeline were notable beneficiaries during 1 9 8 7/8 8 . The Central 
Corridor Group (Tanzania - Burundi/Rwanda/Zaire/Uganda) appears to have 
continued to play a parallel catalyzing role on lake transport and terminals 
albeit less so on the connecting Tanzania Railways lines. The UNCTAD 
supported transit traffic documentation simplification and coordination 
efforts neared successful completion in 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 in respect to all of 
Tanzania's SADCC, Central Corridor and PTA links. Tanzania's PTA membership 
remains marginal to its international and regional economic policy (Kenya and 
Uganda links and trade/clearing agreements are primarily bilaterally 
negotiated) although, as noted in the Budget Speech, it hopes it will make a 
positive contribution to enhanced regional trade.
Growth And Groping In Agriculture
Tanzania's food production growth rate clearly remains on the 3*5 to 4? trend 
which has characterised the whole period since independence. Equally clearly 
annual results are heavily dependent on weather.
By mid-1988 this had led to up to 200,000 tonnes maize carry-over stocks (say
50,000 working level, 80,000 official reserve, 70,000 surplus) with another 
crop in excess of consumption levels expected. This poses a series of 
problems (seen before in 1976-78 when several good harvests came in 
succession). Storage is inadequate and stock losses rise (exacerbated by the 
importation about 1980 of the greater borer beetle from New Orleans); storage 
costs on inter-year reserves are high and cannot realistically be met by a 
commercially oriented grain marketing enterprise; export proceeds are below 
grower price plus transport, storage and financing costs. Added to this is 
the fact that no rational importer wants greater borer beetles and certifying 
any stock as totally infestation free poses problems - otherwise $12 - 15 
million from up to 100,000 tonnes sales to food aid buyers in support of the 
Mozambique emergencia programme would probably have been possible.
NMC has been cut back to a buyer of last resort, intra year stockholder and 
exporter/importer and procurement channel for Dar es Salaam. Co-operatives 
are now the first recourse buyers and largely provision the rest of the 
country (albeit short distance and some North-Lake trade remains in private 
trader hands). Albeit bedevilled by limited co-op transport and by credit 
ceilings flowing from the IMF agreement which do not allow prompt payment in 
good years, the new decentralised structure works better and perhaps at lower 
cost than the monolithic NMC did and the co-op segments apparently break even 
or generate net revenues.
However, the reduced NMC functions - except provisioning Dar - are inherently 
loss making. Interyear storage is expensive and intended to fill shortages in 
bad weather years not profiteer on them, so needs to be government financed 
(as is now for the first time provided in the 1988/8 9 Budget). Exports are 
also natural loss makers because the appropriate grower price is one linked to 
import - not export - parity and export proceeds are, therefore, unlikely to 
recoup more than 50 - 65? of total costs.
Industrial and export crop marketing faces even more severe problems. Credit 
constraints (and inflexible forward planning not rapidly altered to meet 
actual purchase levels) have prevented elimination of payment delays. 
Combined co-op and board costs remain too high - probably because Board 
pruning back to fit reduced functions has been inadequate and regional co-op 
managers are not in practice accountable either to their members or to the 
government as a result of the way the regional co-ops were reintroduced over 
1984-86. Inadequate (deteriorated) vehicle fleets, road conditions, rail 
capacity, processing plant (especially in ginning) and storage capacity add to 
the bottlenecks. The greater availability of inputs - including tools and
fertiliser - is proving useful as is the easier availability of food and 
consumer goods. But overall there is no pretence that the situation or the 
trend is satisfactory. This is especially true as while real price increases 
ahead of inflation were possible over 1986-88 because of devaluation that 
means is shrinking as the need to devalue does and further real grower income 
gains must come from lowering processing, transport, marketing costs and
raising production/productivity. 1989 grower price increases can be of the 
order of 20 - 30$ (except where world prices are falling) but that is barely 
above inflation. Maize price increases in 1988 for 1989 will be less than 20$ 
(as in 1987 for 19 8 8) given their satisfactory level relative to import parity 
and the almost unmanageable surplus position.
In fact 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 purchases (largely 1987 albeit for most crops these will 
appear in 1988 GDP) of main export and industrial crops gave some ground for 
cautious optimism. Cotton reached a record 84,000 tonnes (vs 36,000 in 
1985/86) while on others increases ranged from 2$ (tobacco) to almost 50$ 
(cashew nuts). But except for cotton and marginally coffee the absolute 
levels were in no way satisfactory ranging from under 20$ (cashew and sisal) 
to 80$ (tea, tobacco) of past peaks. In the case of Zanzibar the clove
position - like cashew affected by disease and ageing was even worse - leading
to a suspension of both external and domestic debt service.
Key Bottlenecks - Transport And Manufacturing
Transport and communication net value added rose 7.5$ in 1987. Tazara 
increased tonnage and showed a profit as did the Port of Dar es Salaam. As 
noted SADCC and Central Corridor related rehabilitation projects moved
forward. The lorry rehabilitation project pioneered by EEC was complemented 
by a Federal German one. Rehabilitation began on key segments of the Great 
North and Dar-Arusha trunk highways.
But the overall position remained grim and in respect to Tanzania Railways it 
was by no means evident that the deterioration in roadbed and equipment and 
the linked erosion in carrying capacity had yet been turned around despite a 
decade of efforts. Import priority for fuel and spares had had a marginal 
positive impact but credit limits (especially for smaller hauliers), the 
Railways’ very parlous financial position and a fall in lorry imports to 1,040 
in 1987 from 1,530 in 1986 pushed in the opposite direction.
That the problem is perceived is not in doubt. Nor is the Tanzanian
professional and planning competence to identify key problems, projects and 
policies. However - partly because road construction and much of road 
maintenance is not under Ministry of Transport control while Railways
Corporation planning appears weak on prioritisation and phasing - doubts must 
remain whether a coherent strategy with phased priorities exists or is being 
implemented systematically outside the SADCC Programme of Action sub-sector of 
Tanzanian transport.
For industry an ERP target of 60$ capacity utilisation (more than doubling 
1985 output) exists with an increasing number of specific priorities. 1987 
output rose over 4$ (even on the downward biased GDP estimates which suggests 
6 to 7 % actually achieved). Import support has been focussed on this sector - 
especially inputs into basic consumer and agricultural input production.
Cement output rose 15$ as did jembe (hoe) production while textiles and rubber
products showed 20$ and 49$ rises. On the whole availability of basic 
consumer goods, agricultural inputs and cement improved. But 4$ or even 7$ a 
year is very slow against a target of doubled actual output (and even that 
would not restore the peak 1978 levels).
The two basic problems appear to be operating inputs plus spares and selective 
rehabilitation of deteriorated plant and equipment. Certainly transport, 
water and electricity constraints would reduce output potential if input 
availability and rehabilitation moved rapidly but at the moment they are 
rarely binding. Similarly personnel (especially maintenance and other middle
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level technical) shortages do reduce productivity; but with skilled numbers 
about double 1978 and output half they can hardly be the main factor behind 
poor performance.
1988/89's Annual Plan includes general and targetted import allocation and 
rehabilitation policies for the sector. The latter include tyres and tubes, 
fertiliser, leather, shoes, pulp and paper and - for revenue generation and 
incentive reasons - beer and cigarettes (with steps to fund a new brewery in 
Mwanza to meet interior demand and to reduce transport costs and losses).
A breakthrough to at least 10% manufacturing output growth rates remains 
important to Tanzania. That would probably break manufactured price inflation 
and provide nationwide access (as good weather did for grains in 1986), 
sharply increase recurrent revenue, raise urban worker morale and peasant 
incentives and allow continuation of the sector's welcome (if moderate) growth 
of exports contribution.
Money, Prices and Wages - Some Conundrums
Domestic credit formation rose faster than 2 0% in 198 7 /8 8 - below inflation 
but above IMF agreement imposed levels. The makeup - as in 19 8 6 / 87 - was 
markedly different from the earlier post 1977/78 years. Government borrowing 
was a moderate proportion and enterprise dominant. However, enterprise 
borrowing centred on a few crop buyers (NMC, cotton and tobacco in particular) 
and increases elsewhere look to have been barely adequate to sustain real 
working capital requirements boosted by domestic and import inflation and 
(more welcome) higher output.
The credit problem has two aspects. First the targets are too low and too 
rigid. If enterprises are to rebuild inventories to raise production parallel 
to rapidly rising import and domestic prices they require substantial 
increases (up to 40Í) in bank credit. Further if crop production responds to 
policy measures and weather to have credit ceilings which both delay payment 
for purchases and are broken even by the payments made is self-evidently 
counterproductive. The problems in inter year grain stockholding, export 
processing and transport and reviving manufacturing exacerbate the tightness 
of the ceilings because they delay export recovery of seasonal loans and raise
inventory/sales ratios. To that extent the IMF’s non-contextual,
non-businesslike abstract academic ceilings are (as in other SSA recovery 
cases - notably Ghana) in danger of strangling output not choking off 
inflation.
On the other hand the three main borrowers: NMC, Cotton, Tobacco have real 
problems. NMC cannot clear stocks fast nor at a profit - the change in 
1988/89 inter year stock financing may reduce that problem but it will almost 
always be there in good crop years. Cotton backlogs and financial gaps 
resulting from the 1985-1986 world price collapse have combined with output 
explosions to create a massive financing problem, as have similar delays plus 
incompetence in selling and losses from deteriorating stocks in the case of 
tobacco. These financial gaps are inflationary and do need to be plugged. 
But credit ceilings cannot do it and arguing about them probably distracts 
attention from cost reduction and pipeline movement speedup measures which 
could. Cutting grower prices in the face of inflation or simply not bu/.xng 
surplus grain - as apparently suggested by the IMF - hardly seem plausiole
ways to increase output or food security.
The cost of living index increase in Tanzania - calculated on actual sample 
shopping baskets - has fluctuated around 30$ throughout the 1980s. After a 
drought related leap in 1984 it was 33*3$ in 1985, 32.2$ in 1986 and 29.9$ in 
1987. That is a success in that devaluation from T Sh 16 to T Sh 90 to the 
USA $ was managed without increasing the rate of COL climb - partly because 
good weather damped food price increases. But the margin for devaluation
ahead of COL is now narrow - as demonstrated by the late 19 8 7 , early 1988 COL
escalation when devaluation ran at the unreasonably high rate of 6 to 7$ a 
month from July through December 1987 and the next food price impact is likely 
to be upward with the next drought.
The 1987/988 inflation target of 25$ was missed. Its 1988/89 successor is in 
the 20 - 25$ range. Is it likely to fare better? If the government bank 
borrowing requirement remains below Sh 2,000 million; net new NMC - Cotton - 
Tobacco borrowing can be trimmed from Sh 7,299 to under Sh 4,000 million, 
manufactured output rises at least 5$, there is no drought in 198 8/8 9 , 19 8 8 /8 9  
forex price increases are in the 25 - 35$ range and import support remains on
an upward trend then 20$ is attainable. Each of these targets is quite 
plausible; the problem is that if any one is missed badly so will the COL 
target be missed.
In 1987/88 peasant producers’ real incomes probably rose - perhaps 10$ more 
marketed output and average grower prices up by 20 - 25$ suggests small per 
capita gains. At minimum wage level there was little real change and - even 
with some income tax adjustments - higher wages and salaries bought less.
The 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 wage changes run from 20$ to Sh 1 ,500 (ca $14) per month at 
minimum wage level through 10$ (for government employees but likely to be 
followed by public and many other enterprises) above Sh 6,000 (ca $56) per
month. However, income tax band alterations (with the exemption up to Sh
1,500 parallel to the minimum wage) and rate reductions (from 20 to 75$ 
marginal rates to 15 to 55$) suggest nominal after tax incomes of the order of 
25$ at all levels. This is a landmark; not since 1974 has Tanzania felt able 
to make wage and salary increases roughly parallel to anticipated inflation 
and only from 1986 on has it done so sytematically even at minimum wage level.
Most of the 1987 Nsekela Report on government wages and benefits has now been 
implemented - by Treasury count 100$ on fringe benefits and 65$ on wages
(albeit in real terms, as opposed to nominal, these appear to be 
overestimates). In Dar es Salaam a transport allowance of Sh 330 (about
adequate if access to public bus transport becomes slightly less slow and
problematic) and nationally a complicated rejuggling of rent allowances (which 
may, however, reduce cost to government) were introduced in the Budget.
With improved peasant incomes, a healthier small business climate, more 
available goods, static real minimum wages and modest health and education 
provision gains 1987/88 was and was widely perceived to be a good year
economically for most Tanzanians. Salary earners were an exception and a
disproportionately vocal one although the 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 Budget may cause them to
adopt less stridently unbalanced views. As for many it is the third such year 
of modest gains in a row the 1987/88 outturn has clearly helped rebuild 
morale, confidence and popular support for national policy and - perhaps - to 
focus criticisms more precisely on areas of weakness, incompetence and 
corruption which such criticism may spotlight and make easier to tackle. The
strength of both neo-liberal/’privatise the lot’ and orthodox left/'if it 
moves regulate it1 opposition to national strategy appears less today than in 
1986 and certainly than over 19 8 1 —85 -
Political Stability and Political Will
Tanzania is noted for prioritised political will and real tenacity in seeking 
to follow through on what its political process decides to do. Even those who 
dislike or disagree with some of the choices made tend to agree on that. 
Indeed the reason the Bank and bilaterals began substantial funding rises in 
1986 (atypical on the bilateral side for the first year of an internationally 
’approved’ stabilisation and adjustment programme) was precisely because
Tanzania had taken hard decisions at least as early as 1984 and stuck to them
despite falling external resource transfers and only lagged, limited economic 
payoff.
That tenacity - and the relative stability of economic policy - rests on a 
record of nearly 30 years of seeking and achieving Party consensus before 
major strategic changes while delegating great room for manoeuvre to the
government in articulation and implementation. That is a strength with a cost
- consensus may be hard to reach because CCM even at leadership level is not
merely not monolithic but includes a wider range of political and technical
economic viewpoints than any Western European government. After the collapse 
of the 1980 IMF Agreement, no consensus was reached until 1984 and the failure
of that year's changes to get any international support until 1986 almost
caused a new breakdown of consensus and might have done so had 1984 and 1985 
both been characterised both by speedy economic recovery and some gains on the 
basic services front.
Contrary to some external (and domestic) opinion, the present strategy has 
broad political support based on mass perception things are looking up. There 
are critics (though no longer in key economic ministerial posts) on both the 
left and right; the Minister for Finance is no longer on the National 
Executive Committee but the latter has been true for most of the last 25 years 
and the former has always been the case since Tanzanian political praxis has 
almost never harried or silenced minorities within the broad Party spectrum 
nor prevented non-Party criticism by actual suppression (unless it was on or
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beyond the subversion borderline in a strict sense). The 1984-86 strategy was 
endorsed by CCM as was the 1988-92 Plan which continues it; the President, 
Prime Minister and MF who are seen as its triumvers remain unshaken in office, 
indeed strengthened by perceived success. The Chairman (Julius Nyerere) who 
decided there was a broad enough consensus to act radically in 1984 and to a 
lesser extent in 19 85 and 1986 was re-elected and has - if anything - 
increased the interpretation of the Government's freedom to articulate and 
implement as contrasted with (or complementing) the Party's right to set 
strategic goals and guidelines.
Whether Tanzania is 'going capitalist' is a question so oddly phrased (even if 
often posed) as to elude sensible answers. Tanzania has always allowed a 
substantial private sector role - indeed it burgeoned over 1975-1978, not 
always very prudently or efficiently. It has always had a desire to use joint 
ventures (not always well considered ones) in major new productive 
enterprises. It was then President Nyerere who repeatedly styled inefficiency 
and waste as sins in a poor country seeking a transition to socialism. To 
that extent 1984-88 has been a time of re-emphasising old not setting new 
priorities even if some of the wording appears to go further than it does (at 
least to hard line privatisers and quasi material balance planning 
socialisers). The stress on how to use recovery gains - real grower prices, 
minimum wages, health and education plus new or restored fixed investment - is 
hardly new. Helping people on the bottom to move up while using massive 
education and fixed asset investment to raise the size of the pie dates at 
least to the Arusha Declaration and it is noteworthy that grower prices, 
minimum wages and budget parameters have regularly been set at times that 
prevented their being last minute negotiating points with the Fund or external 
resource providers. To say external reaction was not taken into account is of 
course unreal, but to suppose the Treasury merely happened to time its Budget 
decision so as to present them to IMF, Consultative Group and Paris Club (debt 
rescheduling) dialogues as parameters rather than variables would be naive.
The Long Road Ahead: Next Steps
1988 should be a relatively good year with about 5% growth, a small reduction 
of inflation and - perhaps - a more vigorous recovery of industrial output. 
While external resource transfers are vital, delays in agreeing with the IMF
-19-
are now largely a bothersome formality delaying a more formal and permanent 
debt rescheduling than an immediate threat to continued bilateral and World 
Bank funding as they were in 1984-86.
1989 is more problematic although in the absence of an unexpected terms of
trade collapse or - less unlikely - very bad weather or a South African 
regular army invasion of Mozambique, there is probably more upside room than 
downside risk. The grain reserves would ride out a moderately bad weather 
year and a resource inflow breakdown is unlikely.
Thus 5í GDP growth is likely - a very different balance of probabilities than 
at any time since early 1978. Since Tanzania has had little good luck since 
then ( 1 9 8 5 - 8 8 ' s  good weather, after all, followed six consecutive years of
poor to bad) that says a good deal about economic resilience and coherent, 
strong (even if delayed by the democratic process’ need to reach a consensus) 
economic policy and priority reordering. The upside potential turns (apart 
from a rapid improvement in Mozambican defeating of the armed bandits of RSA 
allowing a sizeable defence budget cut) on reconstruction of weakened 
transport and of processing and manufacturing units paying off and of 
efficiency raising reforms lowering strains on the banking system, the budget 
and the price level. If that happens, then a 6 to 8$ growth record is
attainable and if such improvements continue such a growth rate is possible 
through 1991. Even so that would only take real per capita income back to 93 
to 100Í of its 1977 level.
TRENDS OF SOME IMPORTANT ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR EXTERNAL TRADE 
Table No. 1 (US $ million)
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88* 1988/89**
1. Exports 585 625 570 369 347 335 317 355 388 438
2. Imports   1,145 1,209 1,079 002 875 950 1,024 1,145 1,185 1,230
3. Trade Balance - 5 7 1  _ 584 _ 509 - 5 3 .» -528  -615 -707 -790 -797 -792
4 Trade Balance as %  of
Exports   97-6 93-4 89-3 114 2 112 2 184 223 222 5 205 181
5. Petroleum Im ports....... 216 300 226 210 233 237 196 168 159 169
6. Petroleum Imports as %  of
Exports ............................... 37 48 40 57 67 71 62 47 41 39
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning 
* Likely Out-turn 
** Estimates
TREND OF GOVERNM ENT RECURRENT BUDGET
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88* 1988/89**
1. Recurrent Revenue .
2. Recurrent Expendi­
7,759-1 7,934-1 9,977-3 10,600-0 l/,465-6 18,000-0 22,321-0 31,096-0 46,829-0 70,2120
ture ....................... 7,534-4 9,7890 132,139-0 14,589-3 18,182-0 20,674-0 27,403-0 38,774 0 61,7650 90,272 0
3. Recurrent Uap .......
4. Recurrent Gap as %
Recurrent .Expendi­
+ 215-7 -1,885-7 -3.236 6 —987 3 -2,716-4 -2,674-0 -5,082-0 (7,678-0 -14,9360 -20,060 0
ture ...................... 2-9 19 24 13 6 14 9 12-9 18-5 19 8 24-2 22 2
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning. 
* Likely.
** Estimates.
TANZANIA IMPORTS: 1980— 1987 
Table No. 3  (US $ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987




































2. Intermediate Goods .............................. * ......
Oil .................................................................
fe rtilize rs ......................................................
Products.....................................................









































3. Consumer Go o d s .............................................
Textiles.........................................................


































4. U nclassified  I m p o r t s ....................................... 1 83 0-75 1 91 151 0-61 2 61 2-50 10
Total ... 1,218-59 1,16104 1,112-78 814-54 8/3-95 999 19 1,047-46 1,0920
Memorandum Item:
TSH/US DOLLAR RATE (AVERAGE) ............ 8-2 8-28 9 29 11-14 15 29 17-47 32-77 64 26
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning.
Sources
Primarily: 1.) 1988/89 and 1987/88 Budget Speeches
2.) 1986 Hali ya Uchumi (Economic Review)
3.) African Economic Digest, 1 9 8 7 / 8 8
4.) African Business, 1987/88
5.) 1986 Annual Report, Bank of Tanzania
6.) 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 Daily News
Plus interviews.
